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M, Lany economists think that mone-
tary policy should provide a stable en-
vironment so that the price system, and
the economy, can work efficiently. The
Bretton Woods agreement, adopted in
1944, was an attempt to create an inter-
national monetary order with the long-
term price stability of a gold standard
and the short-term flexibility of a paper
money standard. Because the issuers of
paper money did not adhere to the con-
straints implied by the fixed exchange
rates and the long-term commitment to
the dollar price of gold, the system col-
lapsed in a series of panics between the
fall of 1969 and the spring of 1973.
Ever since the breakdown of the agree-
ment, worldwide inflation has been high
and variable. Over the last 20 years, the
U.S. consumer price index (CPI) has
more than tripled. If stabilizing the price
level becomes the primary objective of
U.S. monetary policy, could we take a
direct approach to that goal and adopt a
price-index target?
This Economic Commentary discusses
some of the issues surrounding price-
level targeting. It also describes the
Swedish monetary experiment of the
1930s, a case in which the central bank
successfully targeted a price level for
several years. The Swedish episode
shows not only that price-level target-
ing is feasible, but that such a direct
approach may be an appropriate method
of stabilizing prices.
• The Pros and Cons of a
Price-Level Target
Under a price-level targeting system,
the central bank would likely adopt a
multiyear path for a particular price
index. The main advantage of such a
system is that it would focus attention on
what should be any central bank's pri-
mary objective: price stability. The current
emphasis in the United States on money
market interest rates and M2 as interme-
diate targets is problematic because these
variables are not important per se. They
are important only as indicators of how
monetary policy is expected to affect
the ultimate goals of price stability and
maximum sustainable economic growth.
The Federal Reserve cannot control out-
put growth directly. Over the long run,
it can raise potential output if it can
make the price system work more effi-
ciently. One way to do this is to stabi-
lize the value of the monetary standard
so that all changes in the nominal price
of a product reflect real factors affecting
demand or supply. By eliminating the
uncertainty associated with inflation,
such a policy would cause the economy
to operate more efficiently. For exam-
ple, a stable price level would eliminate
the complicated calculations made
necessary by inflation; there would be
no need to index wages, taxes, or gov-
ernment benefits. Investors could ignore
inflation risk and individuals could
make long-term contracts without wor-
rying about inflation changing the real
terms of these arrangements.
During the last two decades, the con-
sumer price index has more than
tripled. This article examines the fea-
sibility and appropriateness of estab-
lishing a direct, price-index target as
the primary objective of U.S. mone-
tary policy, and notes the results of
the Swedish Riksbank's experiment
with such an approach during the
1930s.
The main objection to targeting a price
index is that attempting to control prices
directly may destabilize both the econ-
omy and the price level. This objection
is based on the idea that long and vari-
able lags exist between changes in mon-
etary policy and changes in prices. If
such lags are an inherent part of our
economic structure, then it may be im-
possible to target a price index directly.
Studies of the frictions that may be
responsible for these long and variable
lags have offered several explanations.
One is the presence of nominal con-
tracts. People contract today for goods
and services that are to be delivered in
the future. Consumers and investors
borrow money at fixed interest rates,
while workers have both explicit and
implicit labor contracts that often ex-
tend beyond one year.
Another explanation for the lag is that it
is costly to change prices. For example,
ISSN 0428-1276printing a new catalog or menu or alter-
ing the prices on previously marked
goods is expensive, so why incur such
costs if the anticipated price change is
small or expected to be temporary?
Prices may also lag monetary policy be-
cause of incomplete information. Since
people are uncertain about future policy,
they wait until the effects of policy are
realized before modifying their plans (and
their prices). People are also uncertain
about the fundamental economic factors
that affect the markets in which they oper-
ate. This uncertainty causes delays in
changing prices in response to monetary
policy because inflationary effects are
often confused with the real effects of var-
iations in supply and demand. Uncertainty
about the sources of disturbances can
cause changes in the observed correlation
between monetary policy and the price
level.
None of these explanations implies that
a price-level target would be infeasible
or inappropriate. Indeed, since they all
rely on costly price adjustment, what
these explanations do imply are large
welfare losses associated with large
price-level changes. The cost of adjust-
ing prices may be minimized if the
price level is stabilized. The policy ques-
tion is this: Can the Federal Reserve use
deviations of a price index from a target
level to indicate how it should adjust
short-term policy? This is hard to
answer because we have no experience
with a price-level target. The key lies in
discerning how people form expecta-
tions and how these expectations affect
price adjustment.
Although most economists teach that a
long lag exists between changes in mon-
etary policy and changes in the price
level, this was not conventional wisdom
in the 1930s. Studies by Irving Fisher in
the early part of this century indicated
that the mean lag from money to prices
was less than three months:
It was in August, 1915, that the quantity
of money in the United States began its
rapid increase. One month later prices
began to shoot upward, keeping almost
exact pace with the quantity of money.
In February, 1916, money suddenly
stopped increasing, and two and a half
months later prices stopped likewise.
Similar striking correspondences have
continued to occur with an average lag
between the money cause and the price
effect of about one and three-quarters
months.
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Fisher's description of a short lag was
apparently only one of many by con-
temporary observers. A recent econo-
metric study using data from 1894 to
1909 confirms Fisher's conclusion:
Event analysis of panic episodes, ARMA
representations of gold flows, and mac-
roeconomic simulation models of inter-
national adjustment using monthly data
all indicate that adjustment to transac-
tion-balance shocks was essentially com-
plete within three months....Our results
confirm the responsiveness of prices in
the short run. In particular, prices did not
lag related movements in output.
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The long and variable lag between mon-
etary policy and inflation may not be
fundamental to our economic structure,
but may just reflect the reigning mone-
tary policy. If so, there is no reason to
think that these lags would prevent the
successful operation of a price-level
target. Some indirect evidence shows
that the length and variability of the lag
depend on the monetary standard. The
lag was much shorter under the gold
standard, and is much shorter in coun-
tries with hyperinflation. Indeed, infla-
tion may even lead monetary policy
when a change in regime is predictable,
such as before major elections.
We cannot know for certain how the
price level and monetary policy would
be correlated under an untried system.
More important, we do not know wheth-
er attempts to stabilize the price level
would destabilize monetary policy and,
as a consequence, the economy. We can,
however, look back to an episode in
which a central bank—the Swedish Riks-
bank—did target the CPI. At the very
least, the results of Sweden's experiment
show that such a policy is feasible.
• The Swedish Monetary
Experiment
On September 27, 1931, the Swedish
Minister of Finance announced that the
country was leaving the gold standard
and adopting a paper standard. Swe-
den, he said, would preserve the domes-
tic purchasing power of the krona using
"all means available." Britain had aban-
doned the gold standard a week earlier,
and foreign exchange traders were con-
vinced that Sweden would have to fol-
low suit. For one week in September
1931, the Swedish government tried to
stay on the gold standard. The discount
rate was raised twice, from 4 to 5 per-
cent and again from 5 to 6 percent, in
an attempt to stop the drain of gold re-
serves. Many people, including the
managers of the Riksbank, were con-
vinced that inflation would accelerate
if Sweden abandoned gold. When the
country's reserves were virtually
depleted and the decision to leave the
gold standard was implemented, the
discount rate was raised from 6 to 8
percent in an effort to prevent inflation
from rising.
The Riksbank immediately began to col-
lect the data needed to construct a weekly
CPI, which was set equal to 100 in Sep-
tember 1931 (see figure 1). The index was
considered not only an important source
of information about current monetary
policy, but also a measure of the central
bank's primary goal. The CPFs availabil-
ity and performance lent credibility to the
Riksbank's assertions of progress.
Contemporary Swedish policymakers
felt that current price movements con-
tained key information about current
policy. Their goal was to stabilize the
price index using all means at the Riks-
bank's disposal, including changes in
the discount rate, market purchases and
sales of gold and foreign exchange
reserves, and public announcements of
the central bank's intentions.
The policy was loosely based on Knut
Wicksell's 1898 proposal, under which
the central bank would control the price
level by manipulating its instruments to
influence the level of commercial bank
interest rates relative to the "natural"
interest rate. One can think of the natu-
ral interest rate as an expected real rate
of return that would just clear the credit
markets in an economy operating at its
most efficient level, with no inflation orTHE SWEDISH ECONOMY, 1931-41
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deflation. The problem with this proce-
dure was lack of information about the
natural interest rate. Wicksell noted that
one could get around this by looking
directly at prices. If prices were rising,
then bank rates were set too low relative
to the natural rate; if prices were falling,
then bank rates were set too high. It is
easy to see why the Riksbank valued
timely information about prices.
The Riksbank used a combination of
discount-rate changes and changes in
gold and foreign reserves to implement
the new policy. The former were rela-
tively infrequent: After the initial in-
crease to 8 percent, the discount rate
was lowered in a series of steps to 3
percent in December 1933, where it
remained until 1940 (see figure 2).
The regular instrument for "fine-
tuning" policy was the purchase and
sale of gold and foreign reserves (see
figure 3).
In the first quarter of 1932, the Riks-
bank reduced the discount rate several
times as it became increasingly clear
that preventing deflation, not inflation,
would be its major task. The world
depression began to take its toll on Swe-
den in early 1931. The country's exports
were extremely low that year, industrial
production declined dramatically, and
unemployment rose quickly. From this
perspective, it is easy to see why many
contemporary economists believed that
the experiment had failed and that rais-
ing the price level would have been the
appropriate policy. The wholesale price
index had been falling at a 10 percent
rate for almost two years at the time the
new policy was adopted. Thus, in hind-
sight, it seems obvious that the large
discount-rate increases in September
1931 (from 4 to 8 percent) were un-
necessary. Whether they were an impor-
tant source of drag on the economy is
less clear. By early 1932, both wholesale
and consumer prices had stabilized.
The monetary program that started in
the fall of 1931 may not have restored
the wholesale price level to some pre-
vious higher level, but during the
depression it did cause prices to fall less
in Sweden than in all of the other major
industrialized countries. Furthermore,
evidence shows that the downturn was
less severe in Sweden, and that the sec-
tors of the economy that suffered most
were those concentrated in the country's
export industries.
7 This suggests that
external factors — not domestic mone-
tary policy — were the driving force be-
hind the depression in Sweden.
In our judgment, the Swedish experi-
ment with price stabilization ended in
April 1937, when the Riksbank's Board
of Directors abandoned its goal of main-
taining an unchanged CPI and decided
to peg the exchange rate vis-a-vis the
British pound. There was a long period,
from 1933 until early 1937, when the
Riksbank was able to stabilize both theCPI and the pound/krona rate (see fig-
ure 4). The 1931-37 period was one of
a stable price level, while 1933-39 was
characterized by a stable exchange rate.
Between mid-1933 and early 1937,
both the pound rate and the CPI ap-
peared to have been jointly stabilized.
• Conclusion
We focus attention on the Swedish mon-
etary experiment simply because some
people believe that it would be infea-
sible for a central bank to target a price
index successfully. During this episode,
no evidence suggested that the Riks-
bank faced any technical problems in
achieving a stable CPI.
Sweden adopted a goal for the CPI
because the country was forced off the
gold standard. It later abandoned the
price index in favor of an exchange-rate
target after experiencing several years of
price stability.
Sweden is a small and open economy,
so there were good reasons for the
country to choose a fixed exchange rate
as its policy goal. Indeed, this is the
choice of many European countries
today. Because of the presence of a trad-
ing partner (Germany) with a dominant
currency (the deutschemark) and a more
stable inflation record, fixing the ex-
change rate is an attractive option for
most European nations.
The United States does not have such
an option. It can, however, deliberately
attempt to stabilize the purchasing
power of the dollar. Congressional rep-
resentative Stephen Neal recently intro-
duced House Joint Resolution 409,
which would make price stability the
Federal Reserve's overriding long-term
goal. The Chairman and several Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve Board,
along with a number of Reserve Bank
Presidents, have testified in favor of the
resolution. One way to implement this
policy would be through adoption of an
explicit price-level target.
• Footnotes
1. Descriptions of this episode can be found
in Karin Koch, "Paper Currency and Mone-
tary Policy in Sweden," in Economic Essays
in Honour ofGustav Cassel, London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933, pp. 343-
56; Erik T. H. Kjellstrom, Managed Money:
The Experience of Sweden, New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1934, p. 48; Thomas
Brinley, Monetary Policy and Crises, Lon-
don: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1936,
pp. 157-239; and Irving Fisher, Stable
Money: A History of the Movement, New
York: Adelphi Company, 1934.
2. We do not discuss measurement issues or
the choice of index here.
3. See Irving Fisher, Stabilizing the Dollar
in Purchasing Power, New York: E. P. Dut-
ton & Company, 1918, p. 5.
4. See pages 430 and 431 in Charles W. Cal-
omiris and R. Glenn Hubbard, "Price Flex-
ibility, Credit Availability, and Economic
Fluctuations: Evidence from the United States,
1894-1909," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, vol. 104 (August 1989), pp. 429-52.
5. See Lars Jonung, "Knut Wicksell's Norm
of Price Stabilization and Swedish Monetary
Policy in the 1930's," Journal of Monetary
Economics, vol. 5 (1979), pp. 459-96; and
Robert E. Keleher, "The Swedish Monetary
Experience of the Early 1930s and the Mar-
ket Price Approach to Monetary Policy," un-
published manuscript, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, January 1990.
6. The Riksbank posted two discount rates.
Figure 2 is based on the rate used to discount
long-term bonds.
7. For a description of the relative severity
of Sweden's depression, see Richard A.
Lester, Sweden's Experience with Managed
Money, supplement to Svenska Handels-
banken's INDEX, January 1937, pp. 1-31;
and Arthur Montgomery, How Sweden Over-
came the Depression, Stockholm: Alb. Bon-
niers Boktryckeri, 1938, chapter III.
Susan Black is a research analyst and Wil-
liam T. Gavin is an assistant vice president
and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland.
The views stated herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.









Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted provided that
the source is credited. Please send copies
of reprinted materials to the editor.